A Securities Class Action lawsuit is initiated by a large class of shareholders against managers whom they suspect of wrongdoing. This paper proposes that Securities Class Action litigation is an ex post substitute for effective ex ante governance and monitoring. To elaborate this idea, I outline a model in which shareholders see a noisy signal of possible managerial fraud. Since the signal is imperfectly informative, and with costly litigation, shareholders' decision of whether to sue or not is based on the signal as well as the governance and monitoring mechanisms in place in the company. If the signal comes from a strong governed, vigilantly monitored company, shareholders are more likely to attribute it to noise. However if it comes from a company with poor controls in place, then the managers are more likely to have committed fraud and the shareholders sue with a higher probability. I test this idea using various measures of governance and monitoring, and find that firms with high total and abnormal compensation are more likely to be sued. I also find that firms with large institutional blockholders are less likely to be sued, suggesting that blockholders play a monitoring role. However my results find no evidence that outsider-dominated boards or small boards provide effective ex ante governance as a substitute to ex post litigation.
I. Introduction
The primary goal of corporate governance is to solve the agency problem when ownership is separated from management, and to assure investors a return on their investment. As Schleifer and Vishny (1997) put it, "People who sink the capital need to be assured that they get back the return on this capital. Corporate governance mechanisms provide this assurance." The need to impose mechanisms that enforce the rights of investors is related to the agency problem between managers and shareholders. With the absence of direct control over day-to-day managerial decisions, shareholders have to resort to other mechanisms to make sure that managers act in their interests. With increasing instances in the last few years of corporate wrongdoing and managerial fraud, corporate governance mechanisms have gained more importance and media attention than ever before.
One of the most powerful tools available for small investors today to enforce their rights is Securities Class Action litigation. Securities Class Action lawsuits are initiated by one or more shareholders representing a larger group (the "class") of shareholders who suffered losses due to managerial actions. These lawsuits involve allegations that managers have disseminated false or misleading information, or engaged in insider trading or earnings manipulation with the result that shareholders have suffered losses or devaluation of their stock.
With the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, securities class actions have played an increasing role in disciplining managers. The number of cases and the amounts of settlements have increased dramatically in the last 7 or 8 years. Apart from the famous $2.85 billion settlement in Cendant Corporation; there have been several other large settlements in the past few years. For instance, consider these results:
Since litigation requires a specific claim or suspicion of managerial wrongdoing (and not poor governance alone), a key element to this reasoning is the decision of when to sue. One event that could arouse shareholders' suspicions of managerial wrongdoing is an earnings restatement. There is well-documented evidence that managers sometimes falsely represent earnings to be higher than they are, resulting in inflated share prices. On subsequent discovery of the manipulation, earnings are restated causing a steep drop in stock price. An abundance of literature exists on the negative stock price reactions to (and the losses to shareholders arising from) earnings restatements.
1 As pointed out by Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2001) , a restatement can trigger an SEC investigation, lead to replacement of top executives, and result in the firm being significantly penalized by investors. Agrawal and Chadha (2003) add that while accounting measures of earnings management are merely academic constructs without a 'smoking gun', "...a mis-statement of earnings is essentially a direct admission by managers of past earnings manipulation."
However not all restatements can be said to be the result of wanton manipulation by managers for their own benefit. Restatements are also caused by a change in accounting practices or genuine errors that are identified and corrected. Ex post, it is difficult to accurately distinguish benign restatements from intentional mis-statements and manipulations 2 . Thus on seeing an earnings restatement, a shareholder has suspicion of wrongdoing -but since not all restating firms are manipulators, I propose that companies with good ex ante governance mechanisms in place are given the benefit of the doubt whereas companies with poor existing governance mechanisms are more likely to be sued. If a strongly governed, vigilantly monitored company restates its financials, shareholders are more likely to attribute it to a genuine error.
However if a company with poor controls in place restates, then the managers are more likely to have committed fraud, and the shareholders sue with a higher probability. To further elaborate this idea, I define a model in which shareholders receive a noisy 'signal' of possible managerial wrongdoing. In real terms, this signal could be a restatement, as I have described, or could take other forms, e.g. suspicion of managerial insider trading. Shareholders' decision to sue or not is a function of this signal taken together with the type of governance controls in place in the company. All else equal, a company with poor governance and monitoring systems is more likely to be sued than a company with good systems in place.
In the empirical part of this paper, I look at three specific measures of governance and monitoring and examine whether they are substitutes for securities class action suits. The first is a measure of management compensation -both total compensation and abnormal compensation measures. In this regard, I find that firms with high CEO compensation and incentive pay (both absolute and adjusted) are more likely to be the defendants of class action suits. The second test looks at institutional ownership and blockholder ownership. I find that firms with high total institutional ownership are more likely to be sued; however firms with one or more blockholders owning at least 5% of the shares are less likely to be sued. This is consistent with the fact that institutions have more often been plaintiffs in class action suits; and also the prediction that blockholders play a monitoring role in the company. Another monitoring variable I look at is analyst coverage. Here, contrary to my hypothesis, I find that firms with high analyst coverage (both absolute and residual) are more likely to be sued. Finally, I also look at board size and composition and find that they are not significantly related to the probability of a suit.
The results in this paper can have an alternative interpretation. The aim of corporate governance being to align managers' incentives with those of shareholders, one may contend that a securities class action suit is clear and direct evidence that such incentives have not been aligned. The very basis of filing such a lawsuit is to make a case that managers have not acted in the shareholders' best interests; and a class action lawsuit further emphasizes that this is a widespread grievance and not an individual one. Thus firms with securities class action suits (henceforth SCA) may be examples of those in which governance mechanisms have failed; and this may give us the litmus test of effectiveness of any measure of corporate governance.
II. Hypotheses and Literature review
In order to answer the question "Keeping all else constant, which companies are more likely to be defendants in a securities class action lawsuit?", I have the hypotheses as given below.
Hypothesis 1: Companies that have high total compensation and option grants when compared to other industry-size matched companies are more likely to be targeted by an SCA.
Both high total compensation in absolute terms and 'abnormally' high compensation (adjusted for compensation of firms in the same industry and of similar size) are generally considered a sign of an entrenched manager who may not work in the shareholder's interest. Further, stock option grants have been empirically proven to be linked to earnings and stock price manipulation. Thus our ex ante hypothesis leads us to expect to see more SCAs targeting restating companies whose managers have high absolute and abnormal pay; since these restatements are more likely to come from manipulation rather than error. This is not a foregone conclusion, however, because options and restricted stock are forms of incentive pay which, in theory, are designed to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. Looking through the lens of a class action suit which is direct evidence of shareholder disapproval will give a better insight into which of these two effects dominates.
Hypothesis 2: Companies with larger boards and more insiders on the board are more likely to be targeted by an SCA.
The NYSE and Sarbanes-Oxley definitions of good boards are synonymous with smaller boards with few insider board members and hence it is probable that companies violating these definitions would be targets. Though the general consensus on board size is that larger boards are worse, the effect is not monotonic. Very large boards may be inflexible, slow moving and bureaucratic, whereas very small boards may lack experience and diversity of opinion. In terms of inside directors, fewer inside directors on the board are considered preferable so that unbiased parties can monitor board proceedings and decisions.
Hypothesis 3: Companies with lower institutional holdings and analyst coverage are more likely to be defendants in an SCA.
Both a large proportion of institutional holdings and high analyst coverage are widely considered to be proxies for how well a firm's performance is 'monitored' in the markets. Hence according to my hypothesis, SCAs should target firms which have poor ex ante monitoring and are hence more susceptible to managerial malfeasance.
Prior Research
This work draws upon and links a number of threads in the corporate governance, accounting manipulation and securities law literature. Several papers have examined the causes and consequences of restatements, fraud and earnings manipulation. 3 Some recent papers have also looked at the relationship between financial, compensation or governance variables and earnings manipulation. Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) find that restating firms have higher ex ante financing needs, large total accruals, higher P/E and M/B ratios. Agarwal and Chadha (2003) do not find much of a relationship between the probability of restatement and different measures of board and auditor independence whereas Beneish (1999) and Kedia (2003) often requires plenty of skill and an in-depth knowledge of accounting for an investor to look beyond these and assess how pervasive the restatement is. It is also quite likely that companies may be able to disguise the pervasiveness or "core"-ness of a restatement. Hence for an investor to make an assessment about the seriousness of the restatement from the restatement announcement alone (and base her legal actions on it) is extremely difficult. Thus it seems more plausible that the investor sees the restatement itself only as a signal of possible wrongdoing; its seriousness is deduced through other controls in place in the company. A company known to have good governance practices that restates its earnings may be given the benefit of the doubt; a company with entrenched overpaid managers and poor monitoring that subsequently restates its earnings raises strong suspicions of misfeasance.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to ask if Securities Class Action suits are ex post substitutes for ex ante corporate governance and monitoring. I propose that SCAs should come into force especially in those firms in which the other two controls are absent or ineffectivenamely, in firms which have unmitigated agency problems and poor corporate governance controls in place. This is the unique contribution of this paper to the literature.
III. The Model
In a model with perfect information, shareholders will always know when a manager is performing fraudulent actions and will take legal action in such a case. Thus any manager who commits fraud is aware that his actions can be seen by the shareholders and that he will be penalized. If we assume there is heterogeneity among managers in terms of their payoffs from fraud, two possible outcomes may result. Some managers who still find it profitable to commit fraud even after paying the penalty they will surely incur, go ahead and do so and are penalized by a suit. To other managers, the cost of a lawsuit makes it not worth their while to commit fraud.
In either case their actions are fully observed by the shareholder who then takes action on the basis of his observation of the manager's action. In an ideal world, fraud is always punished with a lawsuit. Further, resources are never wasted on suing a manager who does not commit fraud.
However these are not the outcomes we observe in the real world. Instead of observing whether a firm has committed fraud or not, we observe whether a firm has restated its financial statements or not. The occurrence of a restatement is at best a noisy signal of fraud, since a restatement could result either from fraud having been committed or from a genuine accounting error. Thus when an investor observes a restatement, he or she has to deduce whether it is coming from a fraud or an error, and accordingly decide whether to sue or not. In my model, the investor bases this decision on two observables: the type of governance in the firm (weak or strong) and the occurrence of a restatement. This can be explained as follows: a strictly governed firm will have many hindrances in place that deter a manager from committing fraud. Thus the probability of a strictly governed firm committing fraud is lower; and the restatement is more likely to come from an accounting error than from fraud. However if it is a weakly governed firm, then there are not many checks in place that prevent its manager from committing fraud, and therefore on seeing a restatement from such a firm, a shareholder is more likely to sue.
This model assumes incomplete information at the outset between shareholder and manager, and also that the legal system establishes the manager's guilt or innocence beyond all doubt. A manager guilty of fraud is punished with a monetary penalty and a wrongly accused manager is cleared and released. However the shareholder bears a cost of suing a manager suspected of fraud. This cost can be thought of as the money spent on procuring lawyers and the time and energy involved in filing a claim; and is incurred whether the suit is successful (upon which the shareholder earns damages -a cash award) or not. This cost attached to suing prevents a shareholder from indiscriminately suing every firm in the economy, regardless of observables, thus making sure that only legitimate cases come to trial.
A. The baseline perfect information model
The timeline of the model is as follows:
The manager's payoffs and the shareholder's payoffs are described in the table below.
Shareholder's decision
Manager's decision For any interesting conclusions, we must assume A-d > 0 (the shareholder gets a positive benefit by suing if the manager is discovered to have committed fraud). The value of B, g, c, A, d are known to both parties. In this perfect information model, the shareholder can perfectly observe the action the manager has taken, i.e. whether f=0 or 1.
This model can be solved by backward induction.
i) The shareholder's decision at t=2 is as follows: Since f is perfectly observable, the shareholder's decision can be directly conditioned on it.
ii) The manager's decision at t=1 now can be written as: Instead, what they observe is a poor signal of fraud, namely whether the firm has restated its financial statements or not. This is incorporated into the shareholder's decision in the following imperfect information model.
B. Imperfect information model
With the introduction of information asymmetries into this model, we have a new variable r, the restatement variable, which takes the value 1 or 0 based on f but with some noise thrown in.
The timeline here is as follows: The manager's payoffs and the shareholder's payoffs remain the same and are described in the Denote the initial (unconditional) probability that a manager commits fraud by m. Note that this is unconditional and unrelated to the value of r. Consider first the case where the shareholder sees that restate=0. In this case, suppose she chooses s=1 with a probability of α and s=0 with probability (1-α). The posterior probability 5 in terms of m is Pr (f=1/r=0) = m m 5 7 2 − . For this to be a mixed strategy equilibrium, the following two conditions must hold:
1) The shareholder is indifferent between choosing s=1 and s=0, given the mixed strategy employed by the manager. This gives us 4 These values are selected arbitrarily for illustrative purposes; any values will do. The only restriction on them is that for r to be a meaningful (albeit imperfect) signal, it should have more than a 50% chance of being correct. Given our earlier assumption A-d>0 and (1.1), we get U s (s=1) > 0 i.e. U s (s=1)> U s (s=0). Thus under this equilibrium, if the shareholder sees r = 1, in equilibrium she will choose s=1.
(1.3) Equilibrium 2: Don't sue if restate=0, mixed strategy if restate=1
Once again we consider first the mixed strategy case where the shareholder sees that restate=1. In this case, suppose she chooses s=1 with a probability of β and s=0 with probability (1-β). Denote the unconditional probability that the manager commits fraud by m.
We get Pr (f=1/r=1) = m m 5 3 8 + . For this to be a mixed strategy equilibrium, we need:
When the value of r=0 is realized, we again get a pure strategy response described below. The value of g for each firm is public information and is observed by both shareholders and managers. Thus now the shareholder's decision can be conditioned on both r as well as g.
Since g H > g L , the manager of a H firm has a lower utility from choosing f=1 than the manager of a L firm. Thus in either of the two equilibria proposed above, the shareholder's probability of choosing s=1 (for any value of r) is higher for an L firm than for an H firm 6 .
This extension of the model takes into consideration that different types of firms may have different governance structures which could affect the ability of their managers to commit fraud, and their payoffs if they do. The g variable is here considered exogenous and could represent size of a firm, CEO compensation structure, monitoring, board size and composition, etc. I contend that these variables could be incorporated into the shareholders' decision of whether or not to sue a firm that restates its financial statements. If a firm that is strictly governed restates its financial statements, the shareholders may be more likely to attribute the restatement to a simple accounting error rather than malicious intent by the manager to defraud, and the probability of a suit is lower. This model explains the empirical finding that not all restating firms are sued; and likewise that not all firms that did not restate are not sued.
6 See Appendix A for an analytical description of the equilibrium.
IV. Data Description
The base sample of firms in this study consists of all the firms in the Compustat database on WRDS from the period 1997 to 2001. This sample is then further reduced to firms for which I could find board, analyst and compensation information as described below. Of this set of firms, I
identify the firms that have experienced restatements and SCA suit firms from two separate lists.
The data on securities class action suits is sourced from the Stanford Securities Class 
VI. Methodology and Results
The main sample consists of all listed Compustat sample firms in the period 1996-2001. It is a panel data set in which each observation is a combination firm-year. Some of these firm-years have experienced restatements, some of them have experienced suits, and there are also observations in which both (or neither) event has occurred. Table I has summary statistics for the number of observations which have data on each of these variables and Table II lists the number of restatements and suits by year.
The restatements included in this sample are largely material restatements and have received overwhelmingly negative responses from the market. In order to confirm the negative impact of these restatements announcements previously documented, I calculate cumulative abnormal returns for the restating firms on the restatement announcement date. CAR results are reported in Table III for approximately 945 firms in the restating sample. Returns immediately around the announcement date are very negative and significant at a high 0.1% level. There also appears to be a mild leakage of the news to the market in the days prior to the announcement and returns continue to be negative in the days after the announcement. Table IV lists the variables used in the study along with the correlations between them.
As expected, a class action suit is very highly correlated with the occurrence of a restatement in the prior year. It is useful here to look at correlations between variables of the same category in order to avoid multicollinearity in the regressions. For instance, the total number of directors and the number of inside directors are very highly related. However simple transformations such as using LN(Total Dirs.) or Percent(Inside Dirs.) do not solve the problem -on the contrary, they increase the correlation to as high as 86% (not reported here). Hence these could cause problems if used in the same regression. Other than these, I also use two different proxies to measure analyst coverage. The first (NumEst 1) is the average number of analyst estimates for the firm through the year. The second (NumEst 2) is the maximum number of analysts that covered the firm in the last year. The first variable is an average of the number of estimates for the four quarters and the second variable is the maximum over the four quarters. Similarly the first standard deviation (Stdev est 1) measure is the average and the second (Stdev est 2) is the maximum. Of course these alternate measures are highly correlated with each other. Also since option grants form a large proportion of total CEO pay, the Black-Scholes value of option grants and the Total Compensation variables are highly correlated (with a coefficient of 0.84). Table V and Predicted compensation, where predicted compensation is the average industry-size adjusted compensation standard for that firm. Thus abnormal compensation can be positive or negative. We see that on average the CEOs of firms in Column 1 are underpaid (have a negative abnormal compensation) whereas CEOs of firms in Column 3 are highly overpaid, though this difference is not statistically significant. The abnormal incentive pay, however, is significantly higher for the suit firms (both in general and in the suit years) than the non-suit firms. It can also be seen that both the institutional ownership percent and the number of analyst estimates, i.e.
both the 'monitoring' variables, are significantly higher for the suit firms (especially in the suit years) than the non-suit firms, inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. The director variables do not seem to be significantly different across columns, whereas the dividend yield appears to be marginally lower for suit firms. Table V In Table VII I report results of an ordered probit regression that looking at whether the levels of the explanatory variables increase with 'levels of egregiousness'. The dependent variable RESTSUIT takes a value of '0' for companies which have neither restated nor experienced an SCA suit in my sample period, 1 for companies which have either restated or had a suit, and 2 for companies which have had both. The idea here being that one may expect to find a trend in the compensation, governance and monitoring variables as RestSuit increases. Values in the table are the coefficients of covariates that are related the 'hazard' of a suit. This specification has the advantage of correcting for possibly censored data (we do not see the firms with suits prior to or subsequent to the sample period and some of these firms could be wrongly coded as 'zero', biasing the previous analysis. Results here are largely similar to previous results regarding compensation variables, analyst coverage and board size.
VII. Conclusion
Securities Class Actions, in which large groups of shareholders band together to seek recompense for managerial misconduct, are arguably the most clear and direct indicator of firms with agency problems that have gotten out of hand. I take firms which have experienced this form of litigation and look back in their history to see whether such firms are characterized by loose monitoring, high CEO compensation or poor corporate governance in the past. The first research question asks whether CEO pay packages differ for such companies. I find that controlling for restatements, securities class action suits target companies with high (both in absolute and in adjusted terms) executive compensation. This hypothesis is strongly supported in the data, in univariate, multivariate logit and ordered probit specifications. This finding strikes a chord at a time of widespread unease and concern about the size of CEO pay packages, and tells us that the concern is to a large extent justified.
The second research question asks if there exist significant differences between board size and composition for SCA and non-SCA firms after controlling for restatements. In my analysis, I could find no difference in board size and number of insiders on the board between SCA and non-SCA firms. The nonlinear relationship that has been previously hypothesized between board size and firm performance could account for the lack of significant findings in this regard. It is possible that there is an 'optimal' board size or a range of optimal board sizes and anything above or below this range is inefficient. Hence very high and very low board sizes could have the same impact on the probability of an SCA. A similar explanation could exist for the number of insiders on the board as well. However this alternate theory needs to be tested. If my finding is true and there is no relationship between board size/composition and exacerbation of agency conflicts (including earnings manipulation), then this may require a rethink about what we perceive as optimal board size and composition. The limits set by the NYSE listing requirements and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 both presuppose that number of insiders is strongly related to the possibility of fraud and manipulation, for which I find no support in this data.
My third research question connects monitoring by institutional investors and analysts
with the ex-post probability of a lawsuit. I proposed that these two measures should be substitutes for each other. However it looks like lawsuits are commonly targeted towards firms with higher values of institutional investor holdings and analyst coverage. This puzzling finding appears to be robust through several specifications of the test. One explanation could be that it is the institutions themselves that are initiating the securities class actions, a form of lawsuits that were initiated to empower the small individual investor. The results with analyst coverage could come from the fact that large firms are more likely to be sued (see Table III ). However it appears that analysts do not play much of a monitoring role. At the very least, analysts are not able to preempt earnings manipulation by managers or play a role in reducing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders.
Appendix A: Imperfect Information model
Equilibrium 1: Sue if restate =1, mixed strategy if restate=0
Probability that a manager commits fraud = m. When the shareholder sees that restate=0, she chooses s=1 with a probability of α and s=0 with probability (1-α).
We can now get the following posterior probability in terms of m as : 4) The manager is indifferent between choosing f=1 and f=0, given the mixed strategy employed by the shareholder.
This gives us the value of α.
To completely define the equilibrium, we also need to specify what happens when the value of r=1 is realized. The value of m is the same in this case, as 'm' denotes the unconditional probability of committing fraud. We can thus derive the posterior probabilities once again in this Once again we consider first the mixed strategy case where the shareholder sees that restate=1. In this case, suppose she chooses s=1 with a probability of β and s=0 with probability (1-β). Denote the unconditional probability that the manager commits fraud by m. 2) The manager is indifferent between choosing f=1 and f=0, given the mixed strategy employed by the shareholder.
This gives us the value of β .
When the value of r=0 is realized, we again get a pure strategy response described below. 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. The table describes the values of different variables for firms which have had a securities class action suit filed against them, and for firms which have never had a securities class action suit, to see if there is a substantial difference between these values. Column 1 gives mean values for the set of 2386 firms which have never had a securities class action suit during the period of my data. Values are averaged for these 2386 firms over the 6 years of my sample period giving 11762 observations in total. Column 2 has the mean values for 1467 firms which have had a securities class action lawsuit and for which data is available. Here too, the values are averaged over the entire sample period, and so the averages are over 2118 firm-year observations. In Column 3, I pick only the 1467 firm-years which have had a suit in the following year i.e. these are the firm-years immediately preceding a suit. The Wilcoxon Z statistic in Column 4 is the normal approximation of the Wilcoxon Statistic and includes a continuity correction. Results without the normal approximation are identical. This statistic and the associated P-Value measure the difference in means between Column 1 and Column 3.
Variable
(1) Suit=0 Governance Index (from IRRC). Restated takes a value of 1 if the firm has restated its financial statements in the year prior to the suit year, and 0 otherwise. Market Capitalization is a proxy for firm size. Compensation variables relate to the CEO's pay 2 years prior to the year of the (possible) suit and 1 year prior to the year of the (possible) restatement, except for the Total Pay_Top5 variable, which is the average pay of the top 5 executives reported in Execucomp. Abnormal total pay and incentive pay are the residuals from regressing the CEO's pay on industry dummies and size, i.e. it is the abnormal portion of the pay which cannot be predicted with the basic factors. Institutional ownership is measured as (Total shares held by institutions/Total shares of the firm). IsBlock takes a value of 1 if there exist one or more institutional blockholders owning at least 5% of the firm's shares, whereas the NumBlock variable is the total number of such large blockholders. The analyst estimates variable measures the average number of analysts covering the firm during the year prior to the suit year. The last row gives the number of observations used in each regression. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dep. variable: Suit(1/0) Independent variables:
(1) 
